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DOING IT WHEN OTHERS DO: A STRATEGIC MODEL OF
PROCRASTINATION
CLAUDIA CERRONE∗
This paper develops a strategic model of procrastination in which present-biased
agents prefer to perform an onerous task with someone else. This turns their decision
of when to perform the task into a procrastination game—a dynamic coordination
game between present-biased players. The model characterizes the conditions under
which interaction mitigates or exacerbates procrastination. A procrastinator matched
with a worse procrastinator may perform her task earlier than she otherwise would:
she wants to avoid the increased temptation that her peer’s company would generate.
Procrastinators can thus use bad company as a commitment device to mitigate their
self-control problem. (JEL C72, C73, D03, D91)
“Fellowship in woe doth woe assuage, as palmers’
chat makes short their pilgrimage.”
— W. Shakespeare, The rape of Lucrece
I. INTRODUCTION
Several onerous activities that we tend to pro-
crastinate, we also prefer to perform in the com-
pany of others, as company makes such activities
feel less unpleasant.1 This implies that our pro-
crastination behavior is often affected by the pro-
crastination behavior of others.
This paper develops a strategic model of
time-inconsistent procrastination that captures
this feature and explores its implications. As
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1. Rao, Mobius, and Rosenblat (2012) find that stu-
dents are more likely to get vaccinated against the flu when
their friends do, and the excess clustering of friends at inoc-
ulation clinics suggests that they coordinate their vaccina-
tion decisions. Banarjee, Cohen-Cole, and Zanella (2007) find
that women’s probability of getting breast cancer screen-
ing increases with the frequency of screenings among their
coworkers and neighbors, and that this effect does not seem
to be due to learning, since the women in this sample were
employees of a health organization and thus informed about
the benefits of screening.
in the seminal, individual model of procras-
tination by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999),
individuals are present biased, that is, they have
time-inconsistent preferences for immediate
gratification, and must perform an onerous
task. The key and novel feature of my model is
that individuals prefer to perform the onerous
task when someone else does, as they enjoy
company. This simple assumption turns their
individual decision problem, that is, when to
perform the onerous task, into a dynamic game
of coordination between present-biased play-
ers, which I call the “procrastination game.”
In the procrastination game, the players have
potentially heterogeneous present-bias and are
“sophisticated,” that is, aware of their present
bias.2 The task must be performed by a final
period, gets increasingly costly over time, and is
less costly if performed when the other player
does.
As an example, consider a student who must
write an essay by a deadline. As the deadline gets
closer, working on the essay gets increasingly
stressful. The benefit (the grade) is obtained in the
future, past the deadline, and does not depend on
when the essay is written. Working on the essay
may feel less onerous in the company of a friend.
2. I will also explore how the unawareness of the present-
bias affects the main results of the model.
ABBREVIATIONS
ODR: O’Donoghue and Rabin
PPE: Perception-Perfect Equilibrium
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Similarly, applying for a new job, for a nursery
place, or filing taxes, all get increasingly stress-
ful as the deadline approaches, yield a benefit in
the future, independently of when the task is per-
formed, and feel less unpleasant when performed
with a friend, a colleague or a relative.
The procrastination game developed in this
paper is used to characterize the conditions under
which interaction mitigates or exacerbates pro-
crastination relative to the case in which indi-
viduals act in isolation. It shows how individuals
should be matched with each other in order to
mitigate overall procrastination, thereby improv-
ing their welfare and reducing inefficient delay.
The impact of interaction on procrastination
will crucially depend on each individual’s “pro-
crastination type,” which is given by their pro-
crastination behavior in isolation.
The first core result of this paper is the “avoid-
ance of bad company.” A procrastinator paired
with a worse procrastinator may perform her task
earlier than she would in isolation: the expec-
tation of bad company can push her to act ear-
lier. This result illustrates a novel and surprising
mechanism through which procrastinators can
influence each other’s behavior. Consider two
individuals who both procrastinate in isolation
but to a different extent: a severe procrastinator
called Alice, who would perform the task in the
last of out three periods in isolation, and a moder-
ate procrastinator called Bob, whowould perform
the task in the second period in isolation. If they
are sufficiently present biased, the unique equi-
librium of the procrastination game is for Alice
to still perform the task in the last period, and
for Bob to perform it in the first, that is, earlier
than hewould in isolation. The intuition is the fol-
lowing. Alice’s present bias is too strong for her
to perform the task earlier than on the last date,
regardless of Bob’s behavior. Bob knows that he
would perform the task in the second period in
isolation, but that in the presence of Alice he
would no longer be able to resist the temptation to
delay the task to the last period, as Alice’s com-
pany would make delaying additionally tempt-
ing. Hence he will perform the task on the first
date, earlier than he otherwise would, to avoid the
increased temptation that Alice’s company would
generate on the second date. This shows that the
bad company of a “hardcore” procrastinator can
induce a peer with a self-control problem to pro-
crastinate less—it can be used as a commitment
device to mitigate one’s own self-control prob-
lem. Note that, if Bob had a weaker present bias,
he would know he could afford to wait until the
second period, as he would then resist the tempta-
tion to delay further. Thus, one’s completion date
may vary nonmonotonically with their present
bias. The avoidance of bad company carries over
to a procrastination game with more than three
periods or with more than two players.
More generally, the model shows that
the interaction between two “heterogeneous
procrastinators”—two individuals who would
both procrastinate in isolation but to a different
extent—will weakly reduce procrastination.3
That is, they will either behave as in isolation,
one will do the task earlier (“avoidance of bad
company”), or both of them will (“mutual reduc-
tion of procrastination”). In the latter case, the
present bias of the severe procrastinator Alice is
smaller than in the “avoidance of bad company”
case. While she would not do the task in the first
period in isolation, she would in the presence
of Bob. Thus, Alice and Bob will coordinate
to do the task in the first period, earlier than
either of them would in isolation. The result that
company can mitigate self-control problems is
consistent with evidence on social arrangements
and self-control in the workplace.4
The interaction between two “homogeneous
procrastinators”—two individuals who pro-
crastinate to the same extent in isolation—will
weakly reduce procrastination, whereas the
interaction between two “homogeneous
nonprocrastinators” will weakly exacerbate
procrastination. In either case, behaving as they
would in isolation will always be an equilibrium,
but there may also be additional equilibria:
homogenous procrastinators may coordinate on
an earlier date, and homogenous nonprocrastina-
tors may coordinate on a later date. Interaction
may also be harmful when a procrastinator inter-
acts with a nonprocrastinator. These results imply
that matching individuals with each other will
not necessarily reduce overall procrastination:
who is matched with whom matters.
The second core result of this paper is that the
matching that minimizes overall procrastination
may not be stable, that is, there may exist a pair
of procrastinators who both prefer to be matched
with each other over their assigned partner. This
3. Provided that the extent to which they value company
is not large enough to make delaying optimal. This will be
further discussed later.
4. Kaur, Kremer, and Mullainathan (2010) find that hav-
ing a peer with above average productivity increases workers’
work hours and make them less likely to demand commit-
ment. This suggests that peers do not simply influence pro-
ductivity, but also self-control problems.
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is policy relevant, as it suggests that simply let-
ting individuals freely choose their partner may
not minimize overall procrastination in a group.
Principals who can observe or elicit individu-
als’ tendencies to procrastinate should make the
matching. For example, a teacher who wants to
help her students not to delay their assignments
may suggest that each of them works on her
assignment in the company of a classmate, and
propose a list of pairs. Similarly, an employee
of a job centre who wants to help job applicants
not to delay their job searches may suggest that
each of them works on the job searches in the
company of another job applicant, and propose a
suitable match. In either of these examples, indi-
viduals’ time preferences can be inferred from
(and thus proxied by) past behavior, or elicited
through a questionnaire (Falk et al. 2016) for a
parsimonious and experimentally validated sur-
vey module to measure time preferences see.
However, in some situations observing or elic-
iting individuals’ time preferences may be hard
or unfeasible, or there may be additional obsta-
cles (e.g., unknown costs) that make it hard to
implement my model’s implications in practice.
When time preferences cannot be known, a pol-
icy implication can still be drawn: it is bet-
ter to match individuals randomly than to let
them freely choose their partner—as freedom of
choice would not lead to a matching that mini-
mizes overall procrastination.
As an ancillary contribution, the procrasti-
nation game serves as a possible microfounded
model of peer effects in self-control. It describes
novel mechanisms through which present-biased
peers can influence each other’s behavior.5
This paper relates to four strands of the litera-
ture. First, this paper contributes to the theoretical
literature on time-inconsistent procrastination.6
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) show that a
sophisticated individual will procrastinate on an
onerous activity less than a naïve one. My model
extends theirs by arguing that a present-biased
individual may prefer to do an onerous activity
5. See Manski (2000) for a review of social interaction
models where an agent’s preference depends on the behavior
of others. See Nakajima (2007) for an application to smoking
behavior: in his model an agent’s smoking utility depends on
the smoking status of peers.
6. Procrastination may occur even in the absence of
time-inconsistency. In Akerlof (1991) procrastination occurs
because the cost of doing a task is more salient when it is
immediate than when it is delayed. In the model of team
production and moral hazard by Weinschenk (2016), time-
consistent team members procrastinate to free-ride on the
team’s future effort provision.
with others, and that this turns her decision
problem into a procrastination game. Brocas
and Carrillo (2001) show that competing on a
task can mitigate present-biased people’s ten-
dency to procrastinate, whereas cooperating on
a task can exacerbate procrastination. Building
on that, Sogo (2019) shows that competition
can exacerbate procrastination when individuals
underestimate the magnitude of their self-control
problems. My paper complements their work
by showing how present-biased individuals can
influence each other’s procrastination even when
they do not work on joint or competing tasks.
Second, this paper relates to the game-
theoretical literature on self-control. Battaglini,
Benabou, and Tirole (2005) explore how
observing each other’s behavior affects time-
inconsistent people’s ability to overcome
self-control problems, in an environment where
people have incomplete information about their
ability to resist temptation and can learn from
observing others. Interestingly, the result that
bad company can be desirable is also obtained
in their model, although for a different reason:
the ex ante ideal peer is someone with a slightly
worse self-control problem than one’s own, as
“if such a peer can do it, then we can too.”
Fahn and Hakenes (2019) show that if agents
interact repeatedly and can monitor each other,
a relational contract involving teamwork can
serve as a self-disciplining device to overcome
self-control problems. My paper explores an
alternative mechanism through which peo-
ple affect each other’s capability to overcome
self-control problems. Takeoka and Ui (2014)
explore a game where players have self-control
preferences à la Gul and Pesendorfer (2001)
and demand commitment. Their model differs
from mine as it uses a different model of self-
control (and, most importantly, one that does
not involve time-inconsistency) and focuses on
commitment behavior.
Third, this paper contributes to the literature
incorporating time-inconsistent preferences into
game theory. A number of papers introduce time-
inconsistent preferences into extensive form
games (Akin 2007; Lu 2016; Sarafidis 2006;
Schweighofer-Kodritsch 2018). I introduce time-
inconsistent preferences into dynamic games
with simultaneous moves, and propose how to
use risk-dominance and payoff-dominance as
equilibrium selection criteria in such games.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II
introduces the procrastination game under
sophistication. Section III characterizes and
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discusses the equilibrium outcomes of the model,
focusing on the interaction between two individ-
uals who would both procrastinate in isolation,
but to a different extent. Section IV explores
matching in a population of procrastinators.
Section V presents extensions, and discusses a
more general model with more than three periods
or more than two players. Section VI concludes
and discusses avenues for future research.
II. THE PROCRASTINATION GAME
I extend the individual model of procrastina-
tion by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) (hence-
forth, ODR) to a strategic setting.
A. Model
Let  denote a dynamic game which I call
the procrastination game. The game has three
periods, denoted t = 1,2,3, but in the third period
there is no decision to be taken. Let {A, B} denote
the set of players and let ai, t ∈ {0, 1} denote the
action that each player i plays in each period t.
Each player must perform an individual task. In
each period, she must choose either to do the
task immediately (ai, t = 1) or to wait (ai, t = 0).
If she waits, she will face the same decision in
the following period. If she waits until the third
period, she must do the task then.7
Time-inconsistency. Each player i has quasi-
hyperbolic, time-inconsistent preferences.8 Let
ut denote an individual’s utility at time t. Her
intertemporal utility at time t = 1, U1i , is,
U1i ≡ u1 + βiδu2 + βiδ
2u3, where(1)
1 ≥ βi > 0, δ ≤ 1.
𝛿 represents time-consistent impatience
and 𝛽 i captures a time-inconsistent preference
for immediate gratification. If 𝛽 i = 1, (1) is
equivalent to exponential discounting and the
7. See Section V for a discussion of a more general
model with more than 2 players or more than 3 periods, and
Appendix B (Supporting information) for the details.
8. Evidence shows that, when considering two future
periods, people give stronger relative weight to the earlier
period as it gets closer, which implies that the discount fac-
tor increases with the time horizon or, in other words, people
are hyperbolic discounters. Changing the delay might then
change people’s preferences over two options and lead to
time-inconsistency (Thaler 1981). This motivated the intro-
duction of a quasi-hyperbolic model of discounting (Laib-
son 1997; Phelps and Pollak 1968). This simplification of
hyperbolic discounting assumes a declining discount rate
between the current period and the next one, but a constant
discount rate thereafter.
player is time-consistent. If 𝛽 i < 1, (1) describes
quasi-hyperbolic discounting and the player is
present-biased. Following the literature, I con-
sider the individual in each period as a separate
“self” who chooses her current behavior to max-
imize her current preferences, whereas her future
selves will choose her future behavior. A time-
inconsistent individual’s decision problem can
then be modeled as a sequential game between
her selves at different points in time. She is
“sophisticated” if she is able to fully predict her
future (mis)behavior. I assume that both players
are sophisticated. The alternative assumption is
that she is “naïve”: she mistakenly thinks that
she will behave as a time-consistent individual in
the future. This case will be discussed in Section
B.3 (Supporting information).
As this paper is concerned with procrastina-
tion arising from time-inconsistency, I assume
that 𝛽 i < 1. Second, I assume that 𝛿 = 1.9
Task. The task requires only one period of
effort and is completed once begun. It has imme-
diate costs and delayed benefits that are normal-
ized to zero.10 Let c≡ (c1, c2, c3) denote the cost
schedule, where ct ≥ 0 for each t≤ 3.
ASSUMPTION 1. In any procrastination game
, c3 > c2 > c1.
I assume that costs increase over time because
a model of time-inconsistent procrastination is
meant to describe situations in which delaying
is not optimal from an ex ante perspective (i.e.,
the perspective of a fictitious period 0 where
a player weighs all future periods equally) and
arises from time-inconsistency. Moreover, many
onerous tasks get increasingly costly over time,
as the tasks feel more stressful as the deadline
approaches or as delaying generates monetary
costs (e.g., delaying the payment of a fine).
Preferences. Letting 𝜏 i denote the period in
which player i completes the task, 𝜏−i the com-
pletion date of the other player, and 𝜅 the extent
9. This assumption is without loss of generality. Note that
𝛿 = 1 implies that, with two periods, (1) would be equivalent
to exponential discounting. That is why a three-period case is
the simplest case to consider.
10. Following ODR, as 𝛿 = 1, the benefits can be inter-
preted as being obtained in a period after the final one, inde-
pendently of when the task is completed. Moreover, the ben-
efits are assumed to be constant over time. The latter assump-
tion is not necessary, for example, the benefits could poten-
tially be decreasing over time. However, when both costs and
benefits are time-dependent, it becomes more difficult to iso-
late the impact of present bias on completion behavior, as
behavior would also depend on the relative magnitude of costs
and benefits.
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to which she values company, her intertemporal
utility in period t from doing the task in 𝜏 i ≥ t is
given by
Uti (τi|τ−i) ≡
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
−cτi if τi = t ≠ τ−i
−cτi(1 − κ) if τi = t = τ−i
−βicτi if τ−i ≠ τi > t
−βicτi (1 − κ) if τi = τ−i > t
.
In each period t, if player i decides to do
the task immediately (𝜏 i = t), she will suffer that
period’s cost, c𝜏 . If she decides to wait (𝜏 i > t),
she will face the same decision in the following
period. Her decision will depend not only on
her degree of present bias, 𝛽 i, but also on her
opponent’s completion date, 𝜏−i. Whenever she
does the task in the same period as her peer (i.e.,
𝜏−i = 𝜏 i), that period’s cost will be reduced by
κcτi .
11
ASSUMPTION 2. In any procrastination game
, κ ∈
(
0, 1 −max
{
c1
c2
,
c2
c3
}]
.
Assumption 2 ensures that the cost reduction
generated by company is positive, but not so large
as to make the cost of doing the task no longer
increasing over time. The intuition is the follow-
ing. People value each other’s company, but up to
a point—the extent to which they value company
will not be so large as to make delaying opti-
mal from an ex ante perspective. This assump-
tion may seem strong (and, as discussed later,
rules out some equilibria), but if players had an
unboundedly strong preference for coordination,
then trivially any coordinated outcome would be
an equilibrium.12
The players’ preferences are common knowl-
edge; hence the procrastination game is a game
of complete information. It describes situations
in which individuals know each other’s tendency
to procrastinate, as is the case for close social ties
like spouses, siblings and close friends.13
11. The cost reduction generated by company could
potentially be assumed to be fixed. However, this would imply
that, in a setting with increasing costs, the cost reduction
generated by company would be bigger in earlier periods
than in later ones. Since there is no reason why the beneficial
effect of company should vary over time, the case of a fixed
company-induced cost reduction is not insightful.
12. It could alternatively be assumed that individuals
dislike company (𝜅 < 0), or, more plausibly, that they have
heterogeneous preferences for company. Exploring behavior
under heterogeneous attitudes towards company is left for
future research.
13. As further discussed in Section VI, an incomplete
information version of my model would allow for describing
Benchmark case. If the players are assumed
not to value company, that is, 𝜅 = 0, their pref-
erences become
Uti (τi, τ−i) ≡
{
−cτi , if τi = t;
−βicτi , if τi > t.
Their decision problem becomes equivalent to
that of an individual who acts in isolation, as in
ODR. Thus, their individual model of procrasti-
nation is obtained as a special case of my model
and will be used as a benchmark model through-
out this paper.
B. Strategy and Solution Concept
For i∈ {A, B}, let i denote the strategy set
and Ui ∶ A × B → ℝ the payoff function. A
pure strategy is given by si ≡ (ai,1, ai,2(a−i,1)) =
(ai,1, (ai,2(0), ai,2(1))) ∈ i, where, for t∈ {1, 2},
ai, t specifies whether player i∈ {A, B} does the
task in period t or waits, given that she has not yet
done it. The strategy si specifies doing it in period
t if ai, t = 1, and waiting if ai, t = 0. In addition to
specifying when player iwill actually do the task,
a strategy also specifies what she “would” do in
periods after she has already done it. A player’s
strategy in t = 2, ai, 2, will depend on whether
the opponent has done the task in t = 1. Note
that the definition of strategy in a procrastination
game embeds ODR’s definition of strategy.When
𝜅 = 0 the former becomes equivalent to the latter.
Let this 𝜅 = 0 or benchmark strategy be denoted
by s̃i.
In each period t, each self-t player i plays
an action ai, t ∈ {0, 1} to maximize (2), where
ai, t = 1 if 𝜏 i = t and ai, t = 0 if 𝜏 i > t.
ODR’s solution concept under sophistication,
called perception-perfect strategy for sophis-
ticates, requires that the individual chooses
optimally given her current preferences and her
knowledge of her future behavior. A sophisticate
does the task today if and only if, given her
current preferences, doing it now is preferred to
waiting for her future selves to do it. Because the
sophisticate’s decision problem can be modeled
as a sequential game with perfect information
and a finite number of periods, it can be solved
via backward induction.
In a procrastination game, a perception-
perfect strategy for sophisticates requires that,
at each subgame, each player chooses optimally
given her current preferences, her knowledge of
situations in which individuals do not know each other’s
tendency to procrastinate.
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her future behavior and her knowledge of her
opponent’s behavior given her own.
In any dynamic game between present-biased
agents, it is necessary to specify whether each
player can correctly predict her opponent’s future
behavior. I call a player “peer-sophisticated”
if in equilibrium her beliefs about her oppo-
nent’s strategies are correct, and assume that
in a procrastination game every player is peer-
sophisticated.14
ASSUMPTION 3. In any procrastination game
, every player i∈ {A, B} is peer-sophisticated.
When both players are sophisticated and peer-
sophisticated, a pair of strategies (sA, sB)≡ ((aA, 1,
aA, 2(aB, 1)), (aB, 1, aB, 2(aA, 1))) is an equilibrium
of the game  if, in every node, each player
i∈ {A, B} plays a perception-perfect strategy for
sophisticates given her opponent’s behavior.15
I shall call the solution concept thus defined
“Perception-Perfect Equilibrium” for sophisti-
cates (hereafter PPE). Because both players are
sophisticated and peer-sophisticated, backward
induction can be used as a solution concept. A
PPE is equivalent to a subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
DEFINITION 1. (PPE). Given a procrastina-
tion game , a pair of strategies (sA, sB) is a
PPE for sophisticates if, for i∈ {A, B}, si ≡ (ai, 1,
ai, 2(a−i, 1)) satisfies, for all t∈ {1, 2} and for
every 𝜏−i, ai, t = 1 if and only if Uti (t, τ−i) ≥
Uti (τ
′
i , τ−i), where τ
′
i ≡ minτi>t{τiai,τi = 1} and
𝜏−i is the completion date induced by s−i and si.
16
III. EQUILIBRIA
In this section, I will characterize the equilib-
rium outcomes of the procrastination game when
player A (she) and player B (he) are both sophisti-
cated and have potentially heterogenous present-
bias factors. Since time is discrete and multiple
values of a player’s present-bias factor can map
into the same strategy, a player’s “type” will be
14. Note that this assumption combines ODR’s notion
of sequential rationality with regard to the player’s own
future selves with the standard notion from dynamic
games of sequential rationality which incorporates the other
player’s strategy.
15. A perception-perfect strategy profile maps into the
timing of completion, that is, 𝜏 i ≡mint{t|ai, t = 1}.
16. Note that the definition of τ′i refers to what happens
on the equilibrium path.
given by the behavior that her present-bias factor
would lead to, were she acting in isolation.17
As discussed above, when 𝜅 = 0 the definition
of strategy in a procrastination game becomes
equivalent to the definition of strategy in isola-
tion (ODR). Depending on whether c2
c3
<
c1
c2
or
vice versa, there are four or three sophisticated
types respectively. If c2
c3
<
c1
c2
, two types procras-
tinate, albeit to a different extent: the “moderate
procrastinator” performs the task in the second
period, whereas the “severe procrastinator” waits
until the last period to perform the task. The other
two types perform the task in the first period. One
of them does so because her bias is extremely
small, while the other one does to prevent her-
self from procrastinating until the last period. If
c2
c3
≥
c1
c2
, the “moderate procrastinator” does not
exist: the types include only the “severe procras-
tinator” and the two types performing the task in
the first period.
DEFINITION 2. (Types under sophistication). A
sophisticate’s type is given by the strategy she
would choose in isolation.
For i∈ {A, B} and c2
c3
<
c1
c2
, i’s type is
i. “severe procrastinator” if s̃i = (0, 0), that is,
if βi <
c1
c3
;
ii. “moderate procrastinator” if s̃i = (0, 1), that
is, if c1
c2
> βi ≥
c2
c3
;
iii. “non-procrastinator” if s̃i = (1, 1), that is, if
βi ≥
c1
c2
;
iv. “impatient non-procrastinator” if
s̃i = (1, 0), that is, if
c2
c3
> βi ≥
c1
c3
.18
For i∈ {A, B} and c2
c3
≥
c1
c2
, i’s type is
i. “severe procrastinator” if βi <
c1
c3
;
ii. “impatient non-procrastinator” if c2
c3
> βi ≥
c1
c3
;
iii. “non-procrastinator” if βi ≥
c2
c3
.
The figure below illustrates the types under
sophistication for c = (2,3.5,10).
17. The term “type” is just used to denote different pro-
crastination profiles. As mentioned, each player has complete
information on the opponent’s type.
18. As observed by ODR, a sophisticate’s completion
date does not vary monotonically with her 𝛽. A more present-
biased person may do the task earlier than a less present-
biased one as she knows that, if she waited, she would delay.
The less present-biased person knows that she can afford
to wait.
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In most of the paper, I will assume that c2
c3
<
c1
c2
, as the most interesting case is the interaction
between two different types of procrastinators.
Moreover, as discussed at the end of Section A,
this kind of cost increase is plausible in several
real-life situations, particularly for tasks involv-
ing performance. For completeness, in Appendix
C (Supporting information) I will also present the
equilibria of the model under the alternative cost
assumption.19
A. Heterogeneous Types: Two Different
Procrastinators
In this subsection, I assume that c2
c3
<
c1
c2
and
analyze the interaction between a moderate pro-
crastinator and a severe procrastinator.
PROPOSITION 1. The interaction between a
moderate procrastinator B and a severe procras-
tinator A weakly reduces procrastination: either
they behave as in isolation, or one of them does
the task earlier than in isolation, or both do it ear-
lier.
a. Avoidance of bad company: If βA <
c1(1−κ)
c3
and βB <
c2
c3(1−κ)
, the unique equilibrium of the
procrastination game  will be (sA, sB) = ((0, (0,
0)), (1, (0, 1))).
b. Mutual reduction of procrastination: If
βA ⩾
c1(1−κ)
c3
and βB <
c2
c3(1−κ)
, the unique equi-
librium of the procrastination game  will be
(sA, sB) = ((1, (0, 0)), (1, (0, 1))).
Proof. See Appendix C (Supporting informa-
tion). ◾
Proposition 1 states that the interaction
between a moderate procrastinator and a severe
19. Note that under the alternative cost assumption, the
only thing that changes, besides the disappearance of themod-
erate procrastinator, is the condition defining a nonprocras-
tinator. This implies that this assumption yields only three
additional cases: the interaction between nonprocrastinator
and severe procrastinator, the interaction between nonprocras-
tinator and impatient nonprocrastinator, and the interaction
between two nonprocrastinators.
procrastinator who value each other’s company
will weakly mitigate procrastination, provided
that the extent to which they value company
is not so large as to make delaying optimal
from an ex ante perspective (Assumption 2).20
The most interesting result, which I label the
“avoidance of bad company”, is that the bad
company of a severe procrastinator can push a
moderate procrastinator to act earlier than she
would in isolation.
Avoidance of bad company. If the present-
bias of the severe procrastinator, A, is strong
enough, she will leave the task undone until the
last period, as she would do in isolation. She
is too present-biased to benefit from B’s com-
pany: regardless of B’s behavior, she will choose
to delay in both the first and the second period.
What happens to B when he interacts with such
a “hardcore” procrastinator? If his present-bias is
sufficiently strong, he will bring the task forward
to the first period. The intuition is the following.
Being sophisticated, B knows that if he leaves the
task until the second period, he will not be able
to resist the temptation to delay one additional
period to enjoyA’s company. In fact, while if he is
by himself, he is sufficiently patient to resist the
temptation to delay, in the presence of A delay-
ing becomes increasingly tempting. As a con-
sequence, he decides to do the task earlier than
he otherwise would, so as to avoid the increased
temptation that A’s company would generate.
It is interesting to note that, if B had a weaker
present bias, he would perform the task later, in
the second period. In fact, in the first period he
would know that he could afford to wait until
the second period, as he would be sufficiently
patient to resist the temptation to delay further.
This implies that a procrastinator’s completion
date may vary nonmonotonically with his degree
of present-bias. As in the individual model of pro-
crastination by ODR, in my procrastination game
the nonmonotonicity of the completion date in
the degree of present-bias is driven by sophis-
tication. When B is more present-biased, it is
20. As discussed, Assumption 2 rules out that a mod-
erate and severe procrastinators coordinate on the last date
in equilibrium.
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the awareness of his stronger bias that induces
him to perform the task earlier to save himself
from temptation.
Also note that, if A deviated from her optimal
behavior and did the task in the first period, then
B would do the task in the second period, that is,
aB, 2(aA, 1 = 1) = 1.
As further discussed in Section V, the avoid-
ance of bad company carries over to a more gen-
eral setting with more than three periods or more
than two players.
EXAMPLE . Consider a procrastination game
where c = (2,3.5,10), 𝜅 = 0.4, 𝛽A = 0.1, and
𝛽B = 0.5. In isolation, s̃A = (0, 0) and s̃B = (0, 1).
B performs the task in the second period as
3.5<𝛽B × 10. The unique equilibrium of the
procrastination game is (sA, sB) = ((0, (0, 0)),
(1, (0, 1))). B would no longer perform the
task in the second period, as, due to A’s pres-
ence, 3.5>𝛽B × 10(1− 0.4). Foreseeing this,
B performs the task in the first period, as
2<𝛽B × 10(1− 0.4).
Mutual reduction of procrastination. Suppose
that B is a moderate procrastinator as above, and
A is still a severe procrastinator but her bias is
now weaker than in the previous case. Then, the
unique equilibrium of the game will be for A and
B to coordinate to do the task in the first period,
earlier than either of themwould in isolation. The
intuition is the following. Unlike in the previous
case, A is now sufficiently patient that, while
she would not do the task in the first period by
herself, she would in the presence of B, as his
company makes doing the task in the first period
less costly, and thus delaying less tempting. A
prefers doing the task in the first period with
B to doing it in the third period without him.
Therefore, A’s company induces B to do the task
one period earlier than he would in isolation, and
B’s company induces A to do the task two periods
earlier than in isolation.
Similarly, note that, if A deviated from her
optimal behavior and did not do the task in the
first period, then B would no longer do the task
in the second period, that is, aB, 2(aA, 1 = 0) = 0,
as he would delay until the third period with A.
Also note that if B’s present-bias was weaker
than assumed above, then there would also be an
additional equilibrium in which A and B behave
as in isolation.21
21. Coordinating on the second period is not an equilib-
rium because of Assumption 2.
It can be concluded that a moderate
procrastinator and a severe procrastina-
tor are weakly better off—from an ex ante
perspective—interacting with each other than
acting as in isolation: their interaction will not
lead either of them to delay further, but can lead
one or both to delay less.
Discussion. It is worth pointing out what the
necessary conditions for the avoidance of bad
company are and discussing their validity. The
first condition is present-bias. As further dis-
cussed in Section V, in a variant of the game with
exponential discounting, the avoidance of bad
company is not obtained. In equilibrium two het-
erogeneous exponential discounters (who would
perform the task in the second and third periods in
isolation) would behave as in isolation or coordi-
nate. Present-bias is supported by extensive evi-
dence. The second condition is sophistication. As
further discussed in Section V and Appendix B.3
(Supporting information), if the moderate pro-
crastinator was naïve, he would fail to foresee
the increased temptation generated by company
in the second period. Empirical evidence supports
the assumption of sophistication. Many onerous
tasks are recurrent in nature and individuals can
learn about their present-bias over time. The third
condition is that the cost of performing the task
increases over time, and, more specifically, the
cost increase between the third period and the
second is bigger than the cost increase between
the first period and the second. If costs were
nonincreasing, the avoidance of bad company
would not occur (see Section V). As mentioned
in Sections I and II, tasks often get increasingly
onerous over time, as delaying may generate
monetary or psychological costs. For many tasks
involving performance, such as working on a
school assignment or writing a work report, it
is plausible that the increase in stress generated
by delaying is nonlinear: the increase in anxiety
a student or an employee will experience when
postponing the task from the second date to the
last will be bigger than the increase in anxiety
generated by a delay between the first date and the
second. The fourth condition is a (bounded) pref-
erence for company. As discussed in Section I,
empirical evidence from vaccinations and cancer
screening, as well as anecdotal evidence, suggest
that people prefer to perform tasks when others
do. It is reasonable to think that such a prefer-
ence for coordination is not unbounded: people
also care about performing tasks when it is not
too costly to do so.
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B. Heterogeneous Types: Other Cases
In this subsection, I summarize the main
findings from the other cases of interaction
between heterogeneous types.22 A severe pro-
crastinator and a nonprocrastinator/impatient
nonprocrastinator will either behave as in iso-
lation or coordinate on the third or first period.
Similarly, a moderate procrastinator and a non-
procrastinator/impatient nonprocrastinator will
either behave as in isolation or coordinate on the
second or first period.
PROPOSITION 2. The interaction between a
procrastinator and a nonprocrastinator may mit-
igate or exacerbate procrastination: either they
behave as in isolation, or they coordinate on one
of the completion dates they would have chosen
in isolation.
Finally, a nonprocrastinator and an impatient
nonprocrastinator will either behave as in isola-
tion or coordinate on the second period. These
results show that in some cases interaction may
be harmful. Most notably, a nonprocrastinator
may be induced by a moderate procrastinator or
by a severe procrastinator to delay.
C. Homogeneous Types
In a procrastination game between players of
the same type, behaving as in isolation is always
an equilibrium. There can also be additional
equilibria in which the players coordinate on
an alternative date.23 In particular, two procras-
tinators of the same type—two moderate pro-
crastinators or two severe procrastinators—will
perform the task when they would in isola-
tion. If their present bias factors are sufficiently
high, there will also be an additional equilib-
rium in which they perform the task in the
first period. Two nonprocrastinators of the same
type—two nonprocrastinators or two impatient
nonprocrastinators—will perform the task in the
first period as in isolation. If their present bias
factors are sufficiently low, there will also be
additional equilibria in which they perform the
task at a later date. Thus, the interaction between
22. When I study the interaction between a moderate
procrastinator and any of the other types, I implicitly assume
that c2
c3
<
c1
c2
as the moderate procrastinator would not exist
otherwise. I solve the model also under the cost assumption
c2
c3
≥
c1
c2
when such assumption leads to changes in the defi-
nition of types (see Appendix C, Supporting information).
23. If there is a unique equilibrium, it will be equivalent
to the isolation behavior.
two procrastinators of the same type is weakly
beneficial and the interaction between two non-
procrastinators is weakly harmful.
PROPOSITION 3. The interaction between two
procrastinators of the same type weakly reduces
procrastination: either they behave as in isolation
or they coordinate on the first period. The inter-
action between two nonprocrastinators weakly
exacerbates procrastination: either they behave
as in isolation or they coordinate on a later date.
Proof. See Appendix C (Supporting informa-
tion). ◾
The following remark summarizes the impact
of interaction on procrastination.
REMARK . Procrastination is weakly mitigated
when two procrastinators interact, and weakly
exacerbated when two nonprocrastinators inter-
act. It may be mitigated or exacerbated when a
procrastinator and a nonprocrastinator interact.
These results have interesting implications for
firms that want their employees to perform tasks
on time. As pointed out by an anonymous ref-
eree, the cost reduction generated by company
can be interpreted as economies of scale from
teamwork. The first core implication is that work-
ing in teams can reduce procrastination, even
when, as in my setting, employees work on indi-
vidual tasks. However, simply letting employ-
ees work together will not necessarily help: the
impact of teamwork on procrastination depends
on the individual tendencies to procrastinate of
the team members. As an example, two employ-
ees who both tend to procrastinate when they
work by themselves—to the same extent or to
a different extent—should be paired up, as their
interaction may lead them to perform tasks ear-
lier, but not later. In contrast, two employees
who do not tend to procrastinate when they
work by themselves should not be paired up, as
their interaction may lead them to procrastinate.
Hence teamwork is (weakly) better than individ-
ual production when employees have—similar
or different—tendencies to procrastinate in iso-
lation, and (weakly) worse when employees do
not tend to procrastinate in isolation.
D. Equilibrium Selection
As shown above, procrastination games
may yield multiple equilibria, especially when
players have homogeneous types. Equilibrium
selection in dynamic games with simultaneous
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moves and time (in)consistent players is an
unexplored and compelling area. In Appendix A
(Supporting information), I define and analyze
the two main equilibrium selection criteria,
Pareto-dominance and risk-dominance, in pro-
crastination games with homogeneous types and
multiple equilibria. I find that for players of the
same type, there is a general result: behaving
as in isolation will always be the risk-dominant
and payoff-dominant equilibrium—if not the
unique one (Proposition 5). This implies that,
even if the interaction between two players
of the same type can lead to coordination on
an earlier date (see Section C), such welfare-
improving outcomes are not expected to be
chosen. Company—whether potentially ben-
eficial or potentially harmful—may not have
any effect. This suggests that pairing up two
different procrastinators is more likely to be
beneficial than pairing up two procrastinators of
the same type.
For players of different types, these selec-
tion criteria do not yield a general result: the
risk-dominant outcome and payoff-dominant
outcome will crucially depend on the costs and
the degree of present-bias.
IV. MATCHING PROCRASTINATORS
The model’s results imply that a principal who
can observe the agents’ tendencies to procras-
tinate can induce them to delay less by match-
ing them with each other in the appropriate way,
thereby improving their welfare and reducing
inefficient delay. A natural and important ques-
tion is then whether, given two types of agents,
the efficient matching—the matching that mini-
mizes overall procrastination—is stable. If it is,
then principals can allow agents to match freely.
If it is not, then a principal who can observe
the agents’ time preferences should sort types,
and a principal who cannot observe them should
match them randomly rather than allowing for
free matching.
Consider a procrastination game between
a severe procrastinator A with βA <
c1(1−κ)
c3
and a moderate procrastinator B with
βB < min
{
c2
c3(1−κ)
,
c1
c2
}
. In the unique equi-
librium of the game B will do the task earlier
than he would in isolation, and A will do the
task when she would in isolation. If two severe
procrastinators with βA <
c1(1−κ)
c3
interact, in
the unique equilibrium of the game they will
both perform the task in the third period as in
isolation. If two moderate procrastinators with
βB < min
{
c2
c3(1−κ)
,
c1
c2
}
interact, in the risk-
and payoff-dominant equilibrium of the game
they will both perform the task in the second
period as in isolation. This implies that, in a
population of severe procrastinators A with
βA <
c1(1−κ)
c3
and a moderate procrastinators B
with βB < min
{
c2
c3(1−κ)
,
c1
c2
}
, overall procras-
tination will be lower if each person is paired
with someone of the opposite type (negative
assortative matching), rather than with someone
of the same type (positive assortative matching).
In what follows, I explore whether the matching
that minimizes overall procrastination is stable.
Consider a finite set of individuals Ω = {1, 2,
… , n} and two even sets ΩA and ΩB of agents
of type A and B. Let Ω = ΩA ∪ΩB. A matching
𝜇 is a one to one mapping from Ω onto itself
such that for all i, j∈Ω, if 𝜇(i) = j, then 𝜇(j) = i,
where 𝜇(i) denotes the partner of individual i
under the matching.24 If 𝜇(i) = i, then agent i is
single under 𝜇.
Amatching 𝜇 is positively assortativewhen, if
i∈Ωx, then 𝜇(i)∈Ωx, for x∈ {A, B} and 𝜇(i)≠ i
for all i∈Ωx. If nx ≤ n−x, a matching 𝜇 is nega-
tively assortative when, if i∈Ωx, then 𝜇(i)∈Ω−x
for all i∈Ωx and for x∈ {A, B}. As individuals of
the same type are indistinguishable, individuals
only care about which type they are matched to.
A matching 𝜇 is stable, from an ex ante per-
spective, if (a) each player strictly prefers her
partner to being single, and (b) for no pair {i,
j}∈Ω it is the case that i strictly prefers j to 𝜇(i)
and j strictly prefers i to 𝜇(j).25
PROPOSITION 4. In a population Ω of severe
procrastinators Awith βA <
c1(1−κ)
c3
andmoderate
procrastinators B with βB < min
{
c2
c3(1−κ)
,
c1
c2
}
, a
matching 𝜇 is stable if and only if it is positively
assortative.
Proof. See Appendix C (Supporting informa-
tion). ◾
A matching between a moderate procrasti-
nator with βB < min
{
c2
c3(1−κ)
,
c1
c2
}
and a severe
24. This is a version of what is known as the roommate
problem (Gale and Shapley 1962).
25. Stability is defined using an ex ante perspective as at
time 0 individuals are not present-biased and prefer to commit
to perform the task earlier.
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procrastinator with βA <
c1(1−κ)
c3
, despite being
the matching that minimizes overall procrastina-
tion, will not be stable.26 This is due to the fact
that two severe procrastinators will strictly prefer
being with each other to being each with some-
one of the other type. In fact, when two severe
procrastinators are matched with each other, they
will both do the task in the last period, thereby
facing a cost c3(1− 𝜅), whereas when either is
matched with someone of the other type in the
unique equilibrium of the game they will do the
task in the last period by themselves (as their part-
ner will do the task earlier), thereby facing a cost
c3 > c3(1− 𝜅).27
This result implies that, when a principal can
observe the agents’ tendencies to procrastinate,
then he will prefer to sort types rather than
allow for free matching,28 whereas when he can-
not observe that, he will prefer to match the
agents randomly rather than letting them choose
their partner.
Now consider a procrastination game
between a severe procrastinator A with
βA ≥
c1(1−κ)
c3
and a moderate procrastinator B
with βB < min
{
c2
c3(1−κ)
,
c1
c2
}
. In the unique equi-
librium, A and B will coordinate on doing the
task earlier than each of them would in isolation.
In a population of severe types A and moder-
ate types B satisfying these conditions, overall
procrastination will be lower if A and B types
are matched with each other than with their own
types. A negatively assortative matching is then
efficient and stable.
These results are relevant for firms wishing to
reduce inefficient delays caused by their employ-
ees and to assess the potential advantages of
teamwork. When employers know or can easily
elicit their employees’ tendencies to procrasti-
nate, they should pair them up based on these
characteristics. For example, they should pair up
26. My definition of efficiency does not account for the
benefit of company. An alternative approach would be to
account for it. In this case, a positively assortative matching
could be efficient.
27. It is assumed that re-matching is not possible. If
nobody performed the task in the first period, then in the
second period positively assortative matching would become
efficient and thus a principal would want to allow for re-
matching. If moderate procrastinators were aware of the pos-
sibility of re-matching, they would choose not to perform the
task in the first period.
28. As discussed in the introduction, teachers and
employers may be able to observe their agents’ time prefer-
ences from their past procrastination behavior or elicit them
through questionnaires.
employees who tend to procrastinate in isolation,
as teamwork will weakly reduce inefficient delay,
but should not pair employees who do not pro-
crastinate in isolation, as their interaction may
lead them to procrastinate. When employers do
not know their employees’ tendencies to procras-
tinate, then it is better to pair them up randomly
than to allow them to choose their teammates.
V. EXTENSIONS
In this section I discuss a number of exten-
sions. First, I discuss how my main results, par-
ticularly the avoidance of bad company, carry
over to a more general setting with more than
three periods or with more than two players.
Second, I discuss variants of my model with
naïveté, exponential discounting and nonincreas-
ing costs to explore how the avoidance of bad
company depends on sophistication, present-bias
and increasing costs.
More than 3 periods. In a procrastination game
between two heterogeneous procrastinators and
with more than three periods, the avoidance of
bad company and mutual reduction of procras-
tination equilibria still exist, provided that the
two heterogeneous procrastinators would per-
form the task in adjacent periods in isolation.
Most notably, the avoidance of bad company is
still obtained as a unique equilibrium (Appendix
B.1, Proposition 6, Supporting information). In
a procrastination game between procrastinators
and nonprocrastinators with more than three peri-
ods, coordination on the first period can still be an
equilibrium (see Section B.1, Proposition 7, Sup-
porting information) and becomesmore likely, as
delaying the task to the penultimate or last peri-
ods gets increasingly costly.
More than 2 players. The challenge of pro-
crastination games with more than two players
is that behavior depends on how a player’s pref-
erence for company is assumed to vary with the
number of players. At one extreme, it could be
assumed that the company of one is enough: addi-
tional players do not further reduce the cost of
performing the task. At the other extreme, it could
be assumed that each additional player further
reduces the cost by a fraction 𝜅. Something in
between seems more plausible: the company of
each additional player further reduces the cost,
but at a decreasing rate. I assume that a player’s
cost of performing the task in a given period is
reduced by a fraction 𝜅 if another player performs
the task in the same period, and is further reduced
by a fraction κ
2
if a third player performs the task
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in the same period. Furthermore, I assume that
the cost reduction generated by company cannot
be so large as to make the task non-costly.
How do the avoidance of bad company and
the mutual reduction of procrastination equilibria
carry over to a settingwithmore players? In a pro-
crastination game with one severe procrastinator
A and two moderate procrastinators B1 and B2,
the additional temptation generated by one severe
procrastinator is enough to induce two moder-
ate procrastinators to act earlier than they would
in isolation (Appendix B.2, Proposition 8, Sup-
porting information). As the number of moderate
procrastinators increases, the avoidance of bad
company equilibrium becomes less likely and the
mutual reduction of procrastination more likely.
The intuition is that, as the number of moderate
procrastinators increases, the cost of acting for
the severe procrastinator in the first period rather
than in the third decreases.
In a procrastination game between procrasti-
nators and nonprocrastinators, as the number of
nonprocrastinators increases, coordination on the
first period becomes more likely (Appendix B.2,
Proposition 9, Supporting information).
Naïveté. In Appendix B.3 (Supporting infor-
mation) I relax the assumption that both play-
ers are sophisticated. to explore whether a naïve
player is able to avoid bad company. I find that,
in a procrastination game between a naïve moder-
ate procrastinator B and a (sophisticated) severe
procrastinator A, the unique equilibrium will be
to coordinate on performing the task in the last
period (Proposition 10). In the first period, B
delays as he thinks he will do the task in the
second period. But in the second period, he will
not be able to resist the temptation to delay fur-
ther as A’s company makes delaying additionally
tempting. Thus, a naïve moderate procrastinator
will not be able to avoid a severe procrastinator’s
bad company, as he will fail to foresee the addi-
tional temptation that bad company will generate.
A player’s capacity to avoid the exposure to peer-
enhanced temptation requires her to be aware of
her own and her peer’s self-control problems. As
in ODR, in my strategic setting naïveté exacer-
bates procrastination.
Exponential discounting. The avoidance of
bad company result would not be obtained in
a game between heterogenous exponential dis-
counters who value each other’s company. Con-
sider an exponential discounter A, whose 𝛿A is
such that she would perform the task in the third
(and last) period in isolation, and an exponen-
tial discounter B, whose 𝛿B is such that he would
perform the task in the second period in isola-
tion. In equilibrium A and B will behave as they
would in isolation and/or coordinate on one of the
three periods.29 This shows that, while a prefer-
ence for company alone can induce coordination
on a date that one or both of the two players would
not choose in isolation (as in the mutual reduction
of procrastination), the avoidance of bad com-
pany requires both preference for coordination
and present-bias. In the procrastination game it
is because of his present-bias (and sophistica-
tion) that B performs the task in the first period,
without A. In contrast, in a coordination game
between exponential discounters, B will not per-
form the task in the first period without A, as he
prefers to perform it in the second period without
A and knows that, when the second period comes,
he will still prefer that.
Nonincreasing costs. It is interesting to
observe that while the avoidance of bad company
can push one to act earlier, it cannot push one
to act too early, that is, when it is not optimal
from an ex-ante perspective.30 Suppose that the
lowest-cost period is period 2. In equilibrium
moderate procrastinator B will never perform the
task in period 1 to avoid the increased temptation
generated by severe procrastinator A in period
2. In fact, such behavior would require that (a)
B prefers to do the task in period 3 with A than
in period 2 alone, and (b) B prefers to do the
task in period 1 alone than in period 3 with A.
Conditions (a) and (b) are both satisfied if and
only if the cost of doing the task in period 1 is
lower than the cost of doing it in period 2.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper has developed a strategic model
of time-inconsistent procrastination to investigate
the impact of social interaction on procrastina-
tion behavior when individuals value each other’s
company. The key and novel feature of the model
is that individuals prefer to perform an oner-
ous task when others do, as company makes the
task feel less unpleasant. This simple assump-
tion turns their individual task-completion deci-
sions into a coordination game. The model is
29. In an exponential discounting-version of the numer-
ical example above, where 𝛿A = 0.1 and 𝛿B = 0.5—and thus
the completion dates of A and B in isolation would be peri-
ods 3 and 2 respectively—the unique equilibrium of the game
is for A and B to coordinate on performing the task in the
third period.
30. I thank an anonymous referee for bringing my atten-
tion to this case.
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used to establish when the company of a peer
reduces procrastination, and thus how principals
can match individuals with each other to improve
their welfare and reduce inefficient delay.
I find that interaction can lead to new,
welfare-improving outcomes relative to the case
in which people act in isolation. Most notably,
the company of a severe procrastinator can push
a moderate procrastinator to act earlier than
he would in isolation, to avoid the additional
temptation that his peer would generate (which
I call “avoidance of bad company”). Whether
interaction exacerbates or mitigates the pro-
crastination that would emerge in individual
decisions will crucially depend on each player’s
type, which is given by what their behavior in
isolation would be. The interaction between two
heterogeneous procrastinators weakly mitigates
procrastination. Either they behave as they would
in isolation, or one of them does the task earlier
(avoidance of bad company), or both of them
do (mutual reduction of procrastination). The
interaction between two homogeneous procras-
tinators weakly reduces procrastination, and the
interaction between two homogenous nonpro-
crastinators weakly exacerbates it. In either case,
behaving as in isolation is still an equilibrium,
but there may also be additional equilibria where
two procrastinators coordinate on an earlier
date and two nonprocrastinators on a later one.
Interaction may also be harmful when a pro-
crastinator interacts with a nonprocrastinator.
This suggests that letting individuals free to
choose their partner will not necessarily reduce
overall procrastination in a group. Principals who
can observe or elicit individuals’ tendencies to
procrastinate should match them on the basis of
that. Principals who cannot observe individuals’
tendencies to procrastinate should match them
randomly rather than allow for free matching.
This paper raises a number of questions that
future research can address. First, I assume
that agents know each other’s time-preferences.
While this is plausible in the case of close social
ties (e.g., spouses, siblings, flatmates, coworkers,
close friends), it may be less so in the case of
more distant social ties. A natural extension
would be to develop an incomplete information
version of my model and use it to explore how
people influence each other’s procrastination
behavior—and thus how they should be matched
with each other—when they do not know each
other’s time-preferences. Second, future work
can extend my model to the case in which indi-
viduals differ in the extent to which they value
(or dislike) company, and to the case in which
individuals value the company of close ties more
than the company of weaker ties. Third, future
research can explore a sequential-move procras-
tination game. Who should move first, and who
will want to move first? On the one hand, players
may prefer to move first to pull the other towards
their preferred completion date. On the other
hand, present-bias may induce them to delay
their decision by moving second. Finally, future
research can test the avoidance of bad company
result through laboratory or field experiments.
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